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Abstract
In situations where one repeatedly makes decisions under the inuence of
another, how does the former react to the latter|obey or disobey|in order to
change the future exertion of inuence? We study a repeated game between
a decision maker and an external inuence in which the former's regard for the
latter is persistent private information. We show that concern for the future leads
to more disobedience under negative inuence and more obedience under positive
inuence. The acts of obedience and disobedience that seem irrational from a
static perspective are rationalized as costly signals of other-regarding preferences.
Our stylized model analysis is applicable to power dynamics between divisions
as well as the relationship between individuals.
KEYWORDS: inuence, interpersonal behaviors, organizational behaviors, repeated game
1 Introduction
Decision making often takes place under external inuence. Teenagers choose their own
behaviors but parents can inuence their choices by applying psychological pressure.
Engineers do the actual work of developing new products but boards of directors
can exert inuence on it through nancing decisions. A decision maker (DM) is in
control of a choice itself but an external inuence (EI) can alter the choice problem
by manipulating the choice outcomes. When the EI biases the choice problem in favor
of her preferred alternative, we can categorize the DM's reaction as either obeying
(choosing the alternative) or disobeying (choosing another alternative). On certain
occasions, such reaction to inuence appears irrational. Parents are often puzzled why
teenagers disobey them even when there seems no clear benet. Boards of directors can
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face engineers who seem to be disobeying for no good reason. The opposite observation
is possible in dierent settings; The DM may appear irrationally obedient.
In this paper, we build a stylized model for repeated interactions between the two
parties in the absence of contracts. We show that seemingly irrational acts of obedience
and disobedience can be rationalized as costly signals that aect the future exertion
of inuence. We distinguish between negative inuence and positive inuence. In the
case of negative inuence, the DM does not want the EI to exert her inuence and
may show deliberate disobedience to prevent negative inuence in the future. In the
case of positive inuence, the DM wants the EI to exert her inuence and may obey
despite a short term loss in order to receive positive inuence in the future. Thus, the
future concern increases the probability of disobedience (obedience) when inuence is
negative (positive) for the DM.
While past studies have examined the static aspects of inuence activities (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1988), decision control (Aghion and Tirole, 1997), and the power to
enforce obedience (Van den Steen, 2010; Marino et al., 2010) in a one-shot interaction
between the two parties, we focus on the dynamic interplay among these notions.
Under asymmetric information about the DM's preferences, the exertion of inuence
in the future period can depend on obedience in the current period, and the location of
eective decision control can shift over time as the EI adds or withdraws her inuence.
If we frame our analysis in an organizational setting, it provides a new perspective on
how dierent divisions behave in the struggle for eective decision control.
In our model, the DM makes a binary choice, after the EI decides whether or not to
exert inuence by manipulating the choice outcomes in favor of her preferred alterna-
tive. The presence of inuence becomes crucial to the DM's choice when two players,
with positive probability, have a disagreement over which alternative is preferable. We
consider two types of inuence separately. Positive inuence increases the players'
payos from her preferred alternative, while negative inuence decreases the payos
from the EI's unpreferred alternative. The EI's optimal choice of exerting either sort of
inuence depends on whether the DM would choose the alternative that conforms with
her inuence or the alternative opposed to her inuence. Whether the DM is obedient
or disobedient depends on the DM's regard for the EI's preference, which is initially
unknown to the EI.1 We assume the players interact repeatedly (two periods for the
most part). The DM's reaction to inuence in the rst period makes the EI update
1Economists have studied other-regarding preferences primarily in relation to altruism, fairness,
and reciprocity. See Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for the literature review. We also cite them to defend
our assumption that individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their regard for others. For an
insightful discussion on the origins of non-selsh preferences, see Sobel (2005). In the context of
an organization, the assumption here concerns how dierent divisions internalize the prots of each
other.
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her belief about the DM's type, and in this way the DM's obedience and disobedience
in the rst period can aect the inuence choice in the second period.
In Section 2, we present the model setup and discuss the stage game outcomes.
The EI exerts either sort of inuence if she believes that the DM is suciently likely
to obey under the inuence. The inuence choice generally depends on: (i) the EI's
power to manipulate the choice outcomes and (ii) the prior belief about the DM types.
In Section 3, we analyze the two-period model under the assumption that the EI
behaves myopic. Proposition 1 shows that disobedience is more likely to be observed
under negative inuence in the rst period than in the stage game. Disobedience
becomes more attractive under repeated interactions since it can lead to the withdrawal
of negative inuence in the future period. After the observation of disobedience, the
EI updates her belief about the DM type and becomes discouraged to exert inuence
in the second period. Surprisingly, the DM may exhibit disobedience as a costly
signal even when the player's preferences are aligned, if he strongly desires to get
rid of negative inuence. With regard to the earlier examples, seemingly irrational
disobedient behaviors by teenagers and engineers can be explained as costly signaling
that makes parents and boards of directors withdraw their inuence. Proposition 2
shows that when inuence is positive, obedience is more likely to be observed in the
rst period than in the stage game. Obedience becomes more attractive under repeated
interactions since it can lead to the exertion of positive inuence in the future period.2
After the observation of obedience, the EI updates her belief about the DM type and
becomes encouraged to exert inuence in the second period. The DM may, even in
the absence of inuence, exhibit obedience as a costly signal when the preferences are
misaligned. The result for positive inuence rationalizes seemingly irrational obedience
behaviors.
Our study is related to multiple strands of the economics literature. Our main re-
sults concern the ideas of obedience and disobedience. In the context of organizations,
several authors have studied the power to enforce obedience, or interpersonal authority
in the words of Eric Van den Steen.3 Van den Steen (2010) analyzed how rm man-
agers' power to enforce employee obedience depends on the allocation of control rights
and income rights between managers and employees. Van den Steen (2009) investi-
2Bernheim (1994) discussed conformism in a model where actions signal dispositions and therefore
status. Conformism arises because a departure from the social norm will seriously impair status,
which individuals directly care about. In our model, the DM conforms to the EI in order to receive
positive inuence in the future.
3A generic term of authority refers to a multifaceted notion that can be associated with many
dierent ideas. According to Oxford American College Dictionary, it can mean \the power or right
to give orders, make decisions, and enforce obedience" and \the power to inuence others, especially
because of one's commanding manner or one's recognized knowledge about something." See Bolton
and Dewatripont (2013) for various meanings of authority used in the literature.
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gated the question of when rm managers enforce obedience by directly manipulating
decision payos and when by providing information. Marino et al. (2010) studied how
employee obedience depends on external market conditions when rm managers can
replace an unsatisfactory employee with another agent. Our analysis of obedience is
complementary to these studies, since we study the dynamic implication of obedience
in repeated interactions among a xed players.
Another recurrent notion in this paper is inuence. Milgrom and Roberts (1988)
and Milgrom (1988) studied ecient organization design under the assumption that
individuals try to inuence decisions to their benets. In contrast to their static
analysis, our focus is on characterizing the dynamic relationship between the DM and
the EI. For the same reason, our analysis of repeated interactions is dierent from the
studies of how a principal's controlling behaviors of oering monetary rewards (Deci,
1971; Lepper and Greene, 1978) or restricting choice sets (Brehm, 1966; Falk and
Kosfeld, 2006) lead to a negative emotional response from an agent. These studies
report the consequence of external inuence on decision making in experiments that
we consider as one-shot interactions. One notable exception is Seabright (2004). He
showed how monetary rewards weaken the incentives to signal one's civic value through
civic actions, in a setting where a second period is assortative matching with respect
to revealed civic values. By contrast, we consider a dierent type of signaling that
takes place when two players repeat the same sort of interaction.
One feature of our results is that the location of eective control shifts over time
when the EI changes her inuence choice. Aghion and Tirole (1997) were the rst
to systematically investigate a question of who has a de facto control over a choice
alternative. Their main contribution was to distinguish between formal authority|
the right to make decisions|and real authority|the power to inuence others because
of one's recognized knowledge. Many authors (e.g., Aghion et al., 2004; Dessein, 2005)
have built on their model framework and discussed the optimal allocation of formal
authority under dierent assumptions. Li et al. (2016) studied how a principal in
possession of formal authority delegates real authority|they call it power|to an
agent as a reward in an optimal relational contract. In our analysis, formal authority
is xed on the side of agent (DM) and inuence is exerted not though information
exchange or power allocation but through direct payo manipulation.
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2 A Model of Decision Making under External Inuence
2.1 Setup
We study repeated interactions between a decision maker (DM, he) and an external
inuence (EI, she). In each period, the DM makes a binary choice d 2 fX;Y g after
the EI makes an inuence choice e 2 E , where either E = f;; Pg or E = f;; Ng. On
the one hand, the DM has the inalienable right to choose his preferred alternative. On
the other hand, the EI can exert inuence on his decision making by increasing the
players' payos from her preferred alternative (e = P ) or by decreasing the payos
from her unpreferred alternative (e = N), unless she decides not to exert any inuence
(e = ;).
In each period, a preferred alternative i 2 fX;Y g of player i 2 fD;Eg is ran-
domly determined. We assume that their preferences are misaligned (D 6= E) with
probability  2 (0; 1) and aligned (D = E) with probability 1   . We can view 
as a parameter of conict between the players. In the absence of inuence (e = ;),
each player i associates a value of i to his or her preferred alternative being chosen
(d = i) and a value of i to the preferred alternative of the other player  i being
chosen (d =  i). In the case of preference alignment (D = E), their preferred alter-
native yields each player i the combined value of i + i|and the other alternative
the value 0. In the case of preference misalignment (D 6= E), a value for player i
is either i or i depending on whether d = i or d =  i. We assume i > i > 0
for each i 2 fD;Eg so that, in the absence of inuence, the preference misalignment
would lead to disagreement over which alternative should be chosen; Each player i
wants their preferred alternative to be chosen (d = i).
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The EI can exert inuence on the DM's choice either positively or negatively.
Positive inuence increases the players' values from her preferred alternative E by a
factor of 11   1 while not aecting the values from the other alternative :E . In
contrast, negative inuence does not aect the values from her preferred alternative
E but decreases the values from the other alternative :E by a factor of (1   ).
Both types of inuence biases the values from E and :E in the same proportion:
1
1  : 1 = 1 : 1   . Here it is easy to observe that  2 (0; 1) is a parameter of
inuence. When  ' 1, the EI can make the choice of E yield more value to the DM
than the choice of :E , irrespective of his preferred alternative D. When  ' 0, the
inuences have no impact on the values from the alternatives. In sum, player i's value
from decision d 2 fX;Y g when the inuence choice is e 2 f;; P;Ng can be expressed
4The assumption that i =2 f0; ig for each i 2 fD;Eg is imposed for expositional simplicity.
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as: 
1 +

1   Ife=P;d=Eg   Ife=N;d=:Eg
 
iIfd=ig + iIfd= ig

;
where Ifg takes 1 if the statement inside the bracket is true and 0 otherwise.5
We assume that it costs 1  c > 0 for the EI to exert positive inuence. Positive
inuence can be interpreted as: (i) the irreversible spending of costly resources on the
choice of E or (ii) the costly acquisition of information that only enhances the value
from the choice E . We normalize the EI's direct cost of exerting negative inuence
to be zero. However, negative inuence can cost her the loss of the value if the DM
chooses her unpreferred alternative :E against her attempted inuence not to choose
it. Negative inuence can be interpreted as: (i) the withdrawal of the resources from
the choice of :E that cannot be spent eectively otherwise or (ii) the bashing of the
choice :E in a way that reduces its value for both players.
We study a two-period model|a one-time repeated game|in which the discounted
expected utility of player i at the beginning of the game is u1i +iu
2
i , where u
t
i is player
i's expected utility in period t and i is their relative weight on the second period. The
timing of events in each period is as follows. The EI observes E 2 fX;Y g and chooses
her inuence e 2 E . After the observation of the EI's preference E and inuence choice
e, the DM observes D and chooses his decision d 2 fX;Y g. The DM's preference D
and decision d are also observable to the EI. Under these observability assumptions,
each player knows: (i) whether their preferences are aligned or misaligned and (ii)
whether the DM obeys (or disobeys) the EI|whether he chooses d = E (or d = :E).
Last but not least, we assume that the DM's regard for the EI's personal preference,
D, is his private information and constant over time. The EI's prior belief about D
is represented by a continuous distribution F (D) that has full support on (0; D).
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5As an alternative payo structure, one can consider:
i

1 +

1   Ife=P;d=Eg   Ife=N;d=:Eg

Ifd=ig + iu i:
We reject this alternative not just because it complicates the analysis without additional insight but
because it gives rise to altruistic utility of higher order. Player i's utility would include, through the
altruistic part, player  i's altruistic utility,  iui. The plausibility of such assumption is, to our
knowledge, not clear.
6We could alternatively assume that the EI knows D but not D 2 (D;1). We believe that it
is much more natural to assume uncertainty about the other-regarding part of preferences than the
personal preferences over alternatives. As one relevant study, we mention the work by Iyengar and
Lepper (1999). They experimentally showed that the other-regarding preferences are signicantly
dierent between Anglo-American children and Asian-American children.
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2.2 Stage Game Outcomes
We start our analysis with the discussion of the stage game outcomes when the EI
knows the DM's type D. In the absence of inuence (e = ;), the DM chooses
his preferred alternative D irrespective of E , and the EI's expected utility is thus
E + (1   )(E + E). If the EI exerts positive inuence (e = P ), the DM's
decision in the preference misalignment case depends on which player has eective
control. If 11 D  D, the DM has control (d = D) and the EI's expected utility is
  1  c+E+(1 ) 11  (E+E). If 11 D > D, the EI has control (d = E) and
the EI's expected utility is   1  c+  11 E + (1  ) 11  (E + E). If the EI exerts
negative inuence (e = N), the same threshold D = (1   )D becomes critical for
the location of control in the preference misalignment case. If D  (1 )D, the DM
has control (d = D) and the EI's expected utility is (1  )E + (1  )(E + E).
If D > (1   )D, the EI has control (d = E) and the EI's expected utility is
E + (1  )(E + E).
From the comparison of the EI's expected utilities from e 2 f;; P;Ng, we obtain the
following result, where we assume that (1 )(E+E) < c < E+(1 )(E+E)
so that the inuence choice is nontrivial when E = f;; Pg.
Lemma 1 (Stage game outcomes under symmetric information).
In a unique equilibrium of the stage game under symmetric information:
(i) Assume D > (1  )D. The EI exerts positive (negative) inuence if E = f;; Pg
(if E = f;; Ng), and the DM chooses the EI's preferred alternative E.
(ii) Assume D  (1   )D. The EI exerts no inuence and the DM chooses his
preferred alternative D.
Positive inuence increases the DM's expected utility by maxf 11 D   D; 0g+
(1  ) 1  (D + D), while negative inuence decreases it by minfD; D   Dg.
For either sort of inuence, whether the DM obeys or disobeys in the preference mis-
alignment case depends on whether his regard for the EI's personal preference is high
or low: (i) D > (1   )D or (ii) D  (1   )D. We thus say that the DM with
condition (i) is of obedient type and the one with condition (ii) of disobedient type.
We now turn to the stage game outcomes when the EI does not know the DM's
type D. Let q denote the EI's prior belief that the DM is of disobedient type. The
EI's expected utility is: E + (1   )(E + E) in the absence of inuence (e = ;);
  1  c+
h
qE + (1  q) 11 E
i
+(1 ) 11  (E+E) with positive inuence (e = P );
and  [q(1  )E + (1  q)E ] + (1   )(E + E) with negative inuence (e = N).
From the comparison of the EI's expected utilities from e 2 f;; P;Ng, we obtain the
following result, where q()  F [(1  )D].
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Lemma 2 (Stage game outcomes under asymmetric information).
In a unique equilibrium of the stage game under asymmetric information:
(i) Assume E = f;; Pg. If q() < 1   c (1 )(E+E)
[ 11  E E]
 q(), the EI exerts positive
inuence and the DM chooses the EI's preferred alternative E if and only if D >
(1 )D. If q()  q(), the EI exerts no inuence and the DM chooses his preferred
alternative D.
(ii) Assume E = f;; Ng. If q() < E EE (1 )E  q(), the EI exerts negative inuence
and the DM chooses the EI's preferred alternative E if and only if D > (1  )D.
If q()  q(), the EI exerts no inuence and the DM chooses his preferred alternative
D.
The EI exerts inuence if she believes that the DM is suciently more likely to
be obedient (q() < q() or q() < q()); Otherwise, exerting either sort of inuence
is not worth its cost. See Figure 1 for the illustration. When E = f;; Pg, since q()
is decreasing from q(0) = 1 to q(1) = 0 while q() is increasing from q(0) < 1 to
q(1) = 1, there exists  2 (0; 1) such that the EI exerts positive inuence if and only if
 > . When E = f;; Ng, both q() and q() are decreasing, and the inuence choice
generally depends on the shape of distribution F (D). However, since q(1) > 0 = q(1),
there exists  2 (0; 1) such that the EI exerts negative inuence if  > .
(i) E = f;; Pg
;- P -
0  1
0
q() q()
1
q
(ii) E = f;; Ng
N- ;- N -
0  1
0
q()
q()
1
q
Figure 1: The static inuence choice under asymmetric information
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3 Decision and Inuence in Repeated Interactions
In this section we discuss how decision and inuence in the repeated game dier from
those in the stage game. We study the case of negative inuence (E = f;; Ng) in
Section 3.1 and the case of positive inuence (E = f;; Pg) in Section 3.2.7 In these
sections we characterize the dynamic relationship between the DM and the EI by
assuming that the latter is myopic in the sense that each period she chooses her
inuence choice to maximize her expected period utility. This is the same as assuming
E = 0.
3.1 Negative Inuence
Assume E = f;; Ng. As we have seen in Lemma 2 (ii), the EI exerts negative inuence
in the stage game if and only if q() < q(). We rst characterize the conditions
under which the repeated game outcomes dier from the stage game outcomes. Then
we discuss our main prediction that the DM is more likely to show disobedience to
negative inuence in the rst period of the repeated game than in the stage game.
Let ~F be the EI's posterior belief distribution about D at the beginning of the
second period, and let ~q denote ~F [(1  )D], the EI's posterior belief that the DM
is of disobedient type. Now suppose F [(1  )D]  q(). From Lemma 2 (ii), the
EI does not exert inuence and the DM chooses his preferred alternative D. Since
the DM's reaction in the rst period is not informative about his type, the EI's prior
belief is carried over to the second period. Thus ~F [(1  )Djd = D]  q(), and it
follows that the EI does not exert inuence in the second period as well.
Suppose instead F [(1  )D] < q() so that the EI exerts negative inuence in
the rst period. We rst discuss the DM's reaction in the preference misalignment
case. If all the DM types behave as if this is a one-shot interaction, his rst-period
reaction would lead to the EI's belief ~q = 0 in the case of obedience and ~q = 1 in
the case of disobedience. Under this hypothesis, let us consider strategic thinking of
type " = (1   )D + " for small " > 0. If this type disobeys with an immediate
loss of ", the EI will withdraw negative inuence in the second period, yielding the
DM a discounted expected gain of D(D   ") = D(D   "). If " is suciently
small, type " would be better o disobeying. As more types switch from obedience
to disobedience, the EI's posterior belief conditional on disobedience decreases from
~q = 1.8
7We start with the negative inuence case because we nd the results and applications more
interesting than those in the positive inuence case.
8As the reader can see in the proof of Proposition 1, the EI's withdrawal of negative inuence occurs
with probability less than 1, if too many obedient types switch their reactions from disobedience to
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We now turn to the DM's reaction in the preference alignment case. In the stage
game all the DM types would obey since the EI's preferred alternative is his preferred
alternative as well. In the rst period of the repeated game, however, the DMmay show
disobedience to negative inuence if he strongly wants the EI to withdraw negative
inuence in the second period. The cost of disobedience is D + D, while its benet
is Dpd(D  maxfD; (1  )Dg), where pd is the probability that DM withdraws
negative inuence in the second period after having observed disobedience. A simple
cost-benet analysis shows that the DM with lower regard D for the EI's personal
preference has higher incentives to disobey. Disobedience is observed with positive
probability in the alignment case if D < DD.
The following proposition formalizes the discussions above.9
Proposition 1.
(i) The DM's rst-period reaction aects the EI's second-period inuence choice if and
only if the EI exerts negative inuence in the rst period.
Under negative inuence in the rst period:
(ii) The DM disobeys if and only if D  m 2 ((1  )D; D) in the misalignment
case and D  a 2 [0; D) in the alignment case. Disobedience leads to the withdrawal
of negative inuence with positive probability, while obedience leads to the continuation
of negative inuence with probability 1.
(iii) The ex-ante probability of disobedience is strictly greater than the corresponding
probability in the stage game.
(iv) Disobedience is more likely to be observed when: (1) the conict is severer ( is
higher); (2) the inuence is stronger ( is higher) given that  > ; and (3) the future
interaction is more important (D is higher).
Proof. In Appendix.
Proposition 1 provides us many insights about the DM's attitude toward the EI
who has the power to exert negative inuence on his decision making. First, the DM
behaves dierently in repeated interactions than in a one-shot interaction when the
EI exerts negative inuence, which is certainly the case if  >  as we have seen
in Lemma 2 (ii).10 When negative inuence is present, the DM must disobey to
have it removed in the second period. Figure 2 illustrates the dierence of the DM's
obedience.
9Our prediction is unique with the use of the D1 renement introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987).
The renement is used only for the prediction of the preference alignment case.
10Note that the condition E 2 (0; E) is also necessary here. Since q() = 1 for all  2 [0; 1) if
E = 0, and q() = 0 for all  2 [0; 1) if E = E , the EI, irrespective of her belief, exerts negative
inuence if E = 0, and does not exert inuence if E = E .
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reactions between in the stage game and in the rst period of the repeated game when
D < DD.
rst period
stage game
misalignment
0
 disobedience
m
 obedience
D
D
 disobedience
(1  )D
 obedience
alignment
0
disobedience
a
 obedience
D
D
 obedience
Figure 2: The DM's reaction to negative inuence
Second, disobedience as a costly signal occurs because of preference conict. The
threshold type m (a) in the misalignment (alignment) case increases strictly (weakly)
with the degree of conict . When  = 0, m = (1 )D and a = 0. Costly signaling
in the rst period is worthwhile if the presence of negative inuence is suciently
signicant for the DM. Negative inuence matters to the DM only when the preferences
are misaligned. Third, costly disobedience is more likely if the EI has a greater power
to decrease the values from her unpreferred alternative, provided that an increase in
 does not change the inuence choice in the rst period. Fourth, costly disobedience
is more likely if the future relationship represented by the second period is relatively
more important. We note that costly signaling in the misalignment case occurs without
any restriction on D > 0, while the result is not smooth with respect to D in the
alignment case. The DM's disobedience in the alignment case is only observed when
the signaling incentives are suciently strong.
Proposition 1 oers a reasonable explanation about why some teenagers blatantly
disobey parents. What causes confusion for some parents is the fact that some
teenagers do the opposite of what their parents say when they are clearly better o
following the instructions. Our model analysis shows that such disobedient behavior
is completely rational as a costly signal in the alignment case. While many dierent
factors contribute to adolescent rebellion (e.g., the need to build personal identity by
breaking the norm, and the peer pressure to stand up against authority), our signaling
theory is consistent with common explanations that psychologists provide. Teenagers
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disobey because they want to get rid of parents' intervention and to have freedom
over their own behaviors in the future. Disobedience is more likely if parents are more
authoritative ( high), if preferences dier more ( high), and if teenagers have less
respect for their parents (D low).
Another application is organizational conicts. Inside a rm, we can consider its
board of directors as the EI and its engineering department as the DM. In general, the
board and the engineers would not always have aligned objectives regarding what type
of new products they bring to the market. The former would emphasize protability
while the latter would pay more attention to the innovativeness of products. While
engineers are ultimately responsible for the creation of products, the board may be
able to exert negative inuence through nancing decisions. When the board exerts
negative inuence, engineers may show disobedience even when they do not have any
real disagreement.
3.2 Positive Inuence
Assume E = f;; Pg. As we have seen in Lemma 2 (i), the EI exerts positive inuence
in the stage game if and only if q() < q(). Unlike in the case of negative inuence,
the DM's rst-period reaction can matter to the EI's second-period inuence choice in
equilibrium, irrespective of whether the EI exerts positive inuence in the rst period.
This dierence comes from the fact that all the DM types are content with hiding their
identities from the EI in the absence of negative inuence, while some DM types have
strong incentives to reveal their types to the EI in the absence of positive inuence.
Suppose rst that F [(1  )D]  q(), or   . From Lemma 2 (i), the EI
does not exert inuence. In the preference misalignment case, all the DM types
would disobey in the stage game. In the rst period of the repeated game, how-
ever, the DM may obey to reveal that he is of obedient type, asking for positive
inuence in the second period. The cost of obedience is D   D, while its benet
is D ~po
h
maxf 11 D   D; 0g+ (1  ) 1  (D + D)
i
, where ~po is the probability
that DM exerts positive inuence in the second period after having observed obedi-
ence. The argument here implies that the obedient types with D suciently close to
D obey in equilibrium.
In the preference alignment case, it may be possible that the DM disobeys in order
to aect the EI's future inuence choice, just as we have observed disobedience in the
alignment case under negative inuence. In the case of positive inuence, however,
such costly signaling is less intuitive since it is the obedient types who would disobey
to reveal their identity.11 We thus exclude the possibility of such costly signaling from
11Furthermore, we are not sure if such costly signaling is actually feasible. We have not yet proved
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our equilibrium prediction.
Suppose instead that F [(1  )D] < q(), or  >  so that the EI exerts positive
inuence in the rst period. In the misalignment case, suppose, hypothetically, that
all the DM types behave as if this is a one-shot interaction. In this case, disobedience
would lead to the posterior belief ~q = ~F [(1  )D] = 1 > q(), under which the
EI will withdraw positive inuence in the second period. Type " = (1   )D   "
for suciently small " > 0 would be then better o obeying, since an immediate
loss of "1  is more than compensated for by a discounted expected gain of D ~po(1 
) 1  (D+D). The argument here implies that some of disobedient types obey and
the EI will continue positive inuence in the second period. In the alignment case, all
the DM types obey, choosing the common preferred alternative E = D. Since the
DM's reaction in the rst period is not informative about his type, the EI's prior belief
is carried over to the second period and the DM is content with the continuation of
positive inuence in the second period.
The following proposition formalizes the discussions above and Figure 3 illustrates
the DM's reaction in the misalignment case.
Proposition 2.
(i) The DM's rst-period reaction aects the EI's second-period inuence choice when
the preferences are misaligned, irrespective of whether the EI exerts positive inuence
in the rst period.
(ii) In the absence of positive inuence in the rst period (  ), the DM obeys
in the misalignment case if and only if D > 
0
m 2 (0; 1). Under positive inuence
in the rst period ( > ), the DM obeys in the misalignment case if and only if
D > 
00
m 2 (0; (1  )D). Obedience leads to the exertion of positive inuence with
positive probability, while disobedience leads to no inuence with probability 1.
In either case:
(iii) The ex-ante probability of obedience is strictly greater than the corresponding
probability in the stage game.
(iv) Obedience is more likely to be observed when: (1) the conict is less severe; (2)
the inuence is stronger; and (3) the future interaction is more important.
Proof. In Appendix.
Proposition 2 provides us many insights about the DM's attitude toward the EI
who has the power to exert positive inuence on his decision making. First, the DM
behaves dierently dierently in repeated interactions than in a one-shot interaction
only when the preferences are misaligned. Second, obedience as a costly signal is
its existence. We are still working on this part.
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rst period
stage game
without positive inuence
0
 disobedience
0m
 obedience
D
D
 disobedience
with positive inuence
disobedience
00m
 obedience
D
D
0
 disobedience
(1  )D
 obedience
Figure 3: The DM's reaction in the misalignment case
more likely to be observed when preference conict is less severe ( is lower). This
is so because the DM benets from inuence in the alignment case if and only if the
inuence is positive. When preference conict is surely expected ( ' 1), obedience
as a costly signal does not occur in the misalignment case with positive inuence in
the rst period. This is because positive inuence in the second period will not be
valuable for the obedient types who would engage in costly signaling otherwise. Third,
costly obedience is more likely when the inuence is stronger ( is larger) and when
the future relationship is more important ( is larger).
Proposition 2 provides one possible explanation for overly obedient behaviors.
When individuals show obedience by sacricing their personal interests, we can ratio-
nalize such behaviors as a costly signal of how much they care about other concerned
individuals. By showing how obedient they are to the inuence, they expect to receive
positive inuence in the future.
4 Conclusion
We conclude with some discussion of avenues for further research. First, we are cur-
rently extending the repeated game analysis from two periods to innitely many peri-
ods without assuming that the EI is myopic. In the innitely repeated game, we can
characterize the nonstationary equilibria. This change will come in the next version
of this working paper.
Second, we did not investigate the strategic choice between positive and negative
inuence due to analytical intractability. A question of how the EI switches between
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dierent modes of inuence is worth an independent question and model.
Third, we hope to see a static model that formalizes a theory of psychological
reactance by Brehm (1966) and explains the experimental data collected by social
psychologists and experimental economists (Brehm, 1966; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006).
Our conjecture is that the modeling of psychological states about freedom is necessary
for such a model. We believe that a successful model would also account for the idea
of Fromm (1941) as well.
Finally, our model of negative inuence could be applied to political conicts (e.g,
Padro i Miquel and Yared, 2012). In his 1849 essay, Resistance to Civil Government,
Henry David Thoreau argued that it was the duty of conscientious citizens to resist
the unjust government even if that meant breaking the law. His philosophy of civil
disobedience and its massive implementations by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther
King seem to share the idea of disobedience as costly signaling.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) The necessity of F [(1  )D] < q() is obvious from the discussion in the main
text. Its suciency follows from the following arguments.
(ii) Assume F [(1  )D] < q(). The DM exerts inuence in the rst period. Let
po and pd be the respective probability that the EI withdraws inuence in the second
period after having observed obedience and disobedience in the rst period. We rst
show that po = 0 < pd in equilibrium. Suppose, for contradiction, that po  pd.
In this case, if some disobedient type obeys, all the obedient types must also be
obeying. This implies that, after obedience, ~F [(1  )Djd = E ]  F [(1  )D] <
q(). But then po = 0  pd. In this case, the only disobedient types disobey in the
rst period. This means that, after disobedience, ~F [(1  )Djd 6= E ] = 1. But then
pd = 1, a contradiction. Hence po < pd. Now suppose that po > 0. This implies that
~F [(1  )Djd = E ]  q() and ~F [(1  )Djd 6= E ]  q(). But this cannot be
consistent with the Bayes' rule given that F [(1  )D] < q(). Hence po = 0.
Now consider the misalignment case for the rst period. Given that po = 0 < pd,
some of the obedient types as well as all the disobedient types disobey. Let " =
(1   )D + " for " > 0. Type " would be better o disobeying if and only if
" < pd(D   ") or " < pd1+pd D.12 Thus, the DM disobeys if and only if
D  (1  )D + pd1+pd D  m. Given pd, the posterior belief after disobedience
is such that ~F [(1  )Djd 6= E ] = F [(1 )D]F (m)  ~qm(pd), where ~qm(pd) is decreasing
12We use  for D.
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in pd with ~qm(0) = 1. If ~qm(1)  q(), then pd = 1 at equilibrium. Otherwise,
pd 2 (0; 1) such that ~qm(pd) = q().
In the alignment case, type D will be better o disobeying if and only if D +
D < pd(D  maxfD; (1   )Dg). Thus, the DM disobeys if and only if D 
a, where a = (pd   1)D when   2 pd and a =
pd 1
pd+1
D otherwise.
Given pd, the posterior belief after disobedience is such that ~F [(1  )Djd 6= E ] =
minfF (a);F [(1 )D]g
F (a)
 ~qa(pd). If   2 pd , then a  (1  )D. Then ~qa(pd) = 1 >
q(), which implies that pd = 1. Suppose  >
2 
 . If ~qa(1)  q(), then pd = 1 at
equilibrium. Otherwise, pd 2 (0; 1) such that ~qa(pd) = q().
(iii) The ex-ante probability of disobedience is F (m) + (1   )F (a), which is
strictly greater than the corresponding probability F [(1  )D].
(iv) The comparative statics results follow from the fact that m (a) is strictly
(weakly) increasing in , , and . A minor qualication of  >  is needed with
respect to , since otherwise an increase in  may shift the rst-period inuence choice
from N to ;.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) All the DM types obey in the alignment case for the reasons discussed in the
main text. The fact that the DM's rst-period reaction aects the EI's second-period
inuence choice in the misalignment case is proved below.
(ii) Let ~po and ~pd be the respective probability that the EI exerts positive inuence
in the second period after having observed obedience and disobedience in the rst-
period misalignment case. We rst show that ~po > 0 = ~pd in equilibrium, irrespective
of the rst-period inuence choice. Suppose, for contradiction, that ~po  ~pd. Then,
all the DM types would disobey, and ~F [(1  )Djd 6= E ] = F [(1  )D]  q(),
which implies ~pd = 0. But, the D1 renement requires that if the DM obeys, the
EI would believe that the deviator is of obedient type. This means that ~po = 1, a
contradiction. Now suppose that ~pd > 0. This implies that ~F [(1  )Djd 6= E ] <
q(). When F [(1  )D]  q(), this cannot be consistent with the Bayes' rule.
When F [(1  )D] < q(), ~po > ~pd implies that all the obedient types obey and
~F [(1  )Djd 6= E ] = 1. Hence ~pd = 0 in either case.
Assume F [(1  )D]  q(), or    so that the DM does not exert inuence in
the rst period. Given that ~po > 0 = ~pd, the obedient types with D suciently close
to 1 obey. Type D would be better o obeying
D   D < po

maxf 1
1   D   D; 0g+ (1  )

1   (D + D)

:
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This implies that there exists a unique threshold type 0m such that the DM obeys if
and only if D > 
0
m. If (1   )  1 2  , then 0m  (1   )D and ~po = 1 (by the
Bayes' rule), where
0m =
1 + 
h
  (1  ) 1 
i
1 + 
h
 11  + (1  ) 1 
iD:
If (1  ) > 1 2  , then 0m < (1  )D, where
0m =
1  ~po(1  ) 1 
1 + ~po(1  ) 1 
D:
Given po, the posterior belief after obedience is such that ~F [(1  )Djd = E ] =
F [(1 )D] F (0m)
1 F (0m)  ~~qm(~po), where ~~qm(~po) is increasing in ~po with ~~qm(p) = 0 for some
p 2 (0; 1). If ~~qm(1)  q(), then ~po = 1 at equilibrium. Otherwise, ~po 2 (0; 1) such
that ~~qm(~po) = q().
Assume F [(1  )D] < q(), or  >  so that the DM exerts positive inuence
in the rst period. Let " = (1   )D   " for " > 0. Type " would be better o
obeying if and only if "1  < ~po(1   ) 1  (D + D) or " < ~po(1   )(D + D).
Thus, the DM obeys if and only if D > (1   )D   ~po(1   )(D + D)  00m.
Given po, the posterior belief after obedience is such that ~F [(1  )Djd = E ] =
F [(1 )D] F (00m)
1 F (00m)  q

m(~po), where q

m(~po) is increasing in ~po with q

m(p
) = 0 for some
p 2 (0; 1). If qm(1)  q(), then ~po = 1 at equilibrium. Otherwise, ~po 2 (0; 1) such
that qm(~po) = q().
(iii) When   , the ex-ante probability of obedience is [1   F (0m)] + (1   ),
which is strictly greater than the corresponding probability 1    in the stage game.
When  > , the ex-ante probability of obedience is [1  F (00m)] + (1  ), which is
strictly greater than the corresponding probability  [1  q()] + (1   ) in the stage
game.
(iv) The comparative statics results follow from the fact that 0m and 
00
m are strictly
increasing in  while strictly decreasing in  and D.
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